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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of voting about the quantity of a public good.
An experiment has been run in order to test the extent of the strategic bias that
a r i s e si nt h ei n d i v i d u a lv o t ew h e nt h es o c i a lc h o i c er u l ei st os e l e c tt h em e a no f
the quantities voted for; conﬂicting theoretical predictions are available in the lit-
erature on this purpose. The political implications of the mean rule and its eﬀects
upon eﬃciency are also discussed. The role of voters’ information is considered. A
comparison is made with the working of the median rule.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many mechanisms that have been suggested for collective choice do not provide in-
centives for sincere disclosure of preferences; misrepresentation can arise, for example
under majority voting or, with reference to choices pertaining to public goods, in
procedures à la Wicksell and Lindhal.
Two recent studies by Ehlers et al. (2) and by Renault and Trannoy (4) have
revived the discussion on strategic behavior in social choices by focussing upon the
mean vote procedure. They describe the social choice process as aimed at locating
a point within a bounded space , e.g. an interval of the real line, on which the
amount of a public good is measured. Under the mean vote procedure society chooses
the mean of the quantities voted for by the agents. The conclusions reached by
the aforementioned papers about the working of mean vote are opposite, as, under
conditions that will be stated in the following, the former predicts sincere disclosure
of preferences, while the latter predicts widespread strategical behavior.
In this paper, after a discussion of the theoretical problems involved in mean
voting, an experiment is used to test which predictions, if any, are supported by
data.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents and expounds the “opposite”
statements that can be drawn from the Ehlers et al. (§ 2.1) and the Renault and
Trannoy (§ 2.2) paper, while § 2.3 illustrates the historical and the present-day role
of the mean vote procedure respectively in ancient and modern society. Section
3 explains the experiment setting whereas section 4 provides a preliminary data
a n a l y s i s .I ns e c t i o n5a ne c o n o m e t r i cs t u d yi si m p l e m e n t e di no r d e rt ot e s tt h er o l e
of the variables considered in the model under examination in aﬀecting individual
voting behavior. Finally section 6 highlights the conclusions.
22 The mean vote procedure
Strategical voting behavior in social choice procedures can be ruled out only under
speciﬁc conditions. Moulin, in a classical paper (3), analyses the working of a mech-
anism in which each participant directly announces his preferred point on the real
line. The median point among those voted for represents the social choice. Restric-
tion of preferences (single peakedness) secures in this case strategy-proofness, which
consists of the stability of a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium as no agent has incen-
tive to deviate from his bliss point in response to other agents announcing their bliss
points3. This result, however, does not carry over to cases in which preferences have
an unrestricted domain or the problem is multidimensional. Other approaches aimed
at securing sincere revelation of preferences and speciﬁcally designed for the revela-
tion of public goods demand (like the Groves and Clarke mechanisms, for example,
which, in the most widely known versions, imply that truth telling is a dominant
strategy) have other possible drawbacks, like budget imbalance.
2.1 The mean vote and the threshold strategy-proofness
Recently the discussion about strategy-proofness in voting has been revived from
an o n -standard point of view in a paper by Ehlers et al. (2) who adopt a kind of
bounded rationality approach to the problem of collective choice. A basic assump-
tion made by these authors is Lipschitz continuity of the voters’ utility function,
a characteristic that broadly speaking means that utility does not change too fast
when its arguments vary. Lipschitz continuity implies that a choice not aligned with
what the agent prefers entails a utility loss not larger than L times the “distance”
between the preferred point and the socially chosen one. This representation of
preferences, while obviously restricting the permissible transformations of the utility
3Strategy-proofness holds for coalitions as well.
3function, is in line with the idea of a kind of limited ability of agents in perceiving
the utility eﬀects of decisions pertaining to public goods. This might be justiﬁed by
the complexity which characterizes the collective action and the provision of public
goods. Agents might simplify things by considering, for example, that no more than
a given utility amount can ever be gained through a unit increase in the amount of
a public good.
The mechanism studied by Ehlers et al. (2) refers to a multidimensional decision
problem: i.e. society must choose a point within a ﬁnite subset of a Euclidean space,
whose dimensions refer to the issues at stake (i.e. in each dimension the amount
of a given public good or the availability of a given political attribute in a decision
is measured). The suggested procedure is the mean vote, i.e. society chooses the
point whose coordinates are the mean of the coordinates of the points voted for by
citizens. Every participant thus votes for a point, by supplying the vector describing
his preferred choices in each dimension.
With reference to a large enough polity, the mean will become rather insensitive
to the individual vote, thus implying only a small beneﬁt of lying in preference re-
porting. By considering that Lipschitz continuity also sets a cap on the eﬀects in
utility terms, mean voting turns out to be “sharply threshold strategy proof”, as the
gain from lying cannot exceed a given threshold. By considering that ﬁnding an ad-
vantageous strategy for misrepresentation of preferences is likely to be demanding in
terms of information and calculus, threshold strategy-proofness implies a prediction
of truth telling in mean voting procedures whenever the costs of strategical behav-
ior exceed the threshold. The level of the threshold in turn depends positively on
the Lipschitz constant L (i.e. the parameter describing the maximum reactivity of
the utility function), which is assumed to be the same for all the voters, and nega-
tively upon the number of participants in the decision process. Note that threshold
strategy-proofness occurs at the price of individual rationality in voting (why should
4one vote if the eﬀect on the collective choice is negligible?), a well-known problem
that arises also with reference to the majority voting rule in large electoral bodies.
Another problem arising from the Ehlers et al. (2) approach is that they consider
a multidimensional decision in which only public goods or dimensions of a social
choice are involved, i.e. in their model all individual utility functions are deﬁned
on the same domain. Hence, to apply their approach to a problem pertaining to
public goods, it must be assumed that tax shares have already been set, in order to
eliminate the private good from the utility function. This also means, as routinely
happens in median voter models, that a change in the rule for sharing costs modiﬁes
the induced individual preferences and the result of voting. Even with these limi-
tations the approach of Ehlers et al. (2) seems to oﬀer quite a signiﬁcant way out
with respect to the problem of strategical behavior in collective choices.
2.2 Strategic behavior in mean voting
A somewhat more pessimistic message is conveyed by another recent paper that deals
also with the mean voting mechanism and considers the voters’ optimal strategies in
this case. The diﬀerences in the conclusions with respect to the paper by Ehlers et al.
(2) that will be discussed subsequently are largely due to the fact that Renault and
Trannoy (4) consider standard fully rational economic agents. In their setting voters
have single peaked preferences deﬁned on a segment of the real line (on which, for
example, the quantity of a public good is measured), i.e. their problem is unidimen-
sional. Like in the Moulin (3) paper, voters announce (either sincerely or not) their
preferred quantities. Society, however, does not select the median but the mean,
where the mean can be simple (i.e. one man one vote) or weighted. Building upon
results available in the literature, the authors are able to show that there is a unique
Nash equilibrium allocation for this game. The allocation represents a cut point that
separates players into two groups, i.e. all the members of one group would like an
5Figure 1: Nash equilibrium of mean vote
amount larger than the equilibrium one and thus vote for the maximum quantity
of the public good (with reference to the interval in which the social choice must
lie) whereas the members of the other group would like a quantity lower than the
equilibrium amount and thus vote for the minimum quantity. The working of the
model is illustrated in Figure ??. Let us assume perfect information of voters about
all the bliss points and the corresponding voters’ weights. Consider a continuum of
voters indexed by x, uniformly distributed4 on the unit interval [0,1]. Consumers
with a high x have a low bliss point y, i.e. a low preferred quantity of the public
good. In Figure ??, therefore, the negatively sloped curve represents bliss points as
af u n c t i o no fx, while the positively sloped curve represents the cumulative weight in
terms of votes. As an equal weight for all the voters has been assumed in the Figure,
the latter curve is the 45◦ line. Note that the cumulative weight curve also measures
4We resort to some simplifying assumptions only for expository purposes. For a more general
presentation see Renault and Trannoy (4).
6the value progressively assumed by the mean if voters vote 1.T h ec u tp o i n ti st h e
abscissa of the point where the two curves intersect, while the equilibrium allocation
is the ordinate of the same point. On the left-hand side with respect to the equilib-
rium point, as long as the bliss points curve lies above that of cumulative weights,
by voting 1 the agent reduces as much as possible the gap between the social choice
so far (i.e. the cumulative weight) and his bliss point. Note that such a voter does
not fear that the vote of the next agent might push the mean above his bliss point,
as the next agents less intensively want the public good. The opposite reasoning
holds on the other side, where the curve of cumulative weights lies above the bliss
points curve. Voters on this side vote 0. For the agent located at the cut point, the
bliss point and the progressive mean coincide. On the other hand, because of the
continuity assumption, this type is of measure zero. Thus the model predicts that
virtually all the agents will hide their preferences and choose an extremist behavior.
When there is a discrete number of agents, on the other hand, it might happen that
one agent5 exactly reaches his preferred quantity by ﬁne tuning his vote within the
interval, thus adopting a non-extremist behavior. Renault and Trannoy (5) also ﬁnd
that the strategic bias is independent of the information structure of the game, and
thus occurs also when the assumptions pertaining to the participant’s information
about the other people’s bliss points or weights in the vote are relaxed.
As far as the equilibrium allocation is concerned, it may or may not coincide
with the mean of actual bliss points. Mean vote performs better than the median
one in eliciting the actual mean of bliss points if the latter (once data have been
normalized) is central in the interval [0,1].
5If there are many voters in this position there might be multiple Nash equilibria, while, however,
the equilibrium allocation is still unique.
72.3 The political relevance of the mean vote rule
To the best of our knowledge, there is no political tradition concerning the use of
a mean rule in voting. Procedures that work more or less as if a mean rule were
adopted can be found, however. Some interesting cases are reviewed by Renault
and Trannoy (4). They focus particularly upon the “forced to pay free to choose”
mechanisms, under which agents choose which share of the taxes they pay must
go to speciﬁc uses, e.g. to the ﬁnancing of their preferred school district or to a
speciﬁc religious confession. The amount of money devoted by society to each of
these uses can thus be seen as the mean of the shares chosen by taxpayers, weighted
by the amount of taxes that each citizen pays. In fact the currently used mechanisms
only allow discrete choices (e.g. in Italy taxpayers have to decide whether to allocate
0.8% of income tax to a religious confession or not), but if the prediction of extremist
behavior holds, the only relevant alternatives are in fact discrete and extreme, and
thus the idea of mean voting is tenable.
One might also rationalize in terms of mean vote the procedures based on rota-
tion, under which the choice is made by a member of the relevant body that stays in
charge for a given (short) period and then steps down while a second member takes
charge. The policy that ensues over a period (e.g. one year) can then be described
as the mean of the policy choices made by the members, where individual choices
are weighted by the time span in which everyone is in charge and by the appro-
priate discount factor if relevant. Rotation has been widely used in the European
institutions and is also provided for in the recently designed constitution, where it
is mandated for the presidency of the EU’s sectorial Councils and for the members
of the Commission, which must correspond to two thirds of the number of Member
States.
Another approach that can be rationalized in terms of the mean rule is the
random assignment of the right of deciding to a member of a social body who stays
8in charge for a short period and is followed by another member chosen at random
too, and so on. The method of drawing lots was widely used in classical Athens
to select chairmen of political assemblies, members of the government, oﬃcials and
judges; in fact drawing lots was the rule while other methods of selection were the
exception. Drawing was often used jointly with rotation. Arisoteles6 for example
refers that the epistate of the Pritaneon who, among other powers and duties, was
in charge of guarding the Treasury of the State, was drawn to serve for one day and
could hold that position only once in life.
The logic behind these approaches seems that of protecting against dictatorship
and corruption, avoiding a too ﬁerce political struggle for power and securing low
transaction costs. When equal weights are adopted, participants in the decision
process are endowed with equal power and are assumed to have equal ability to
represent the whole body. Mean voting diﬀers from the rotation and random selection
procedures mainly because it avoids variance around the mean (and hence the risk)
that the latter systems involve. Renault and Trannoy (4) also stress a potential role
of the mean rule for protecting minorities. In the “forced to pay free to choose”
model, for example, religious minorities can convey funds to their preferred schools,
while a median voting procedure might disregard in full their preferences (i.e. the
median voter might choose a zero amount for a good that is of vital interest for a
minority). Thus mean voting might prevent social unrest or secessions in multiethnic
or multireligious countries or federal states.
Unfortunately, the mean rule does not secure eﬃciency in the choice of the col-
lective good amount, even in cases in which sincere revelation of preferences occurs.
While Bowen (1), in a famous contribution, has shown that eﬃciency occurs when
the mean of marginal rates of substitution equals marginal cost/number of agents
(which is the equivalent of the Samuelson eﬃciency rule, i.e. the sum of marginal
6in the Athenaion Politeia, 44, 1.
9rates of substitution equals marginal cost), this is a condition referred to mean de-
mand prices and not to mean quantities. From this point of view, the mean rule
does not seem better than the median rule implied by majority voting, i.e. neither
secure eﬃciency in collective choices.
103T h e e x p e r i m e n t
The aim of the experiment is to test whether the mean rule actually prompts sincere
revelation of preferences or not, and in the latter case if extremist behavior prevails.
It also aims to test the eﬀects of the mean voting rule upon social welfare. The
median vote rule is used in the experiment as a control treatment.
The experiment was run in March 2005 at the AL.EX laboratory of the University
of Eastern Piedmont “A. Avogadro” in Alessandria (Italy). It was programmed by
Marie-Edith Bissey and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999(6)).
Twenty-four undergraduate students from diﬀerent years and faculties7 participated
in it. The experiment took about an hour and the payment was around 10 euros per
capita.
In order to keep the experiment simple, it was designed in just one dimension, by
inviting the participants to vote for their preferred amount of a public good in the
interval [0 − 10]. Participants receive payoﬀs based on quadratic utility functions,
which are thus single peaked and are assumed to describe each participant’s net ben-
eﬁt8 as a function of the amount of the public good. As attention is restricted to the
interval [0,10], the utility functions considered are Lipschitz continuous. However, it
is obviously by no means taken for granted that when the payoﬀ is evaluated by each
participant on the basis of his actual individual utility function this characteristic
still holds.
In the experiment payoﬀs are provided to the participants on paper instructions
- in a table and via a graphic representation - and they can also digit an amount
for the public good on their computer and check the result in terms of payoﬀ on the
7The AL.EX laboratory of the University of Eastern Piedmont maintains a list of students
willing to participate in experiments. They are recruited through an announcement on the web site
and alerted when an experiment is programmed.
8It is thus assumed that the cost shares have been set, so that each agent’s utility only depends
on the public good.
11computer screen before voting. The actual payment to each participant is represented
by his payoﬀ in a randomly selected round out of the 15 actually played.9
8 types of preferences were assigned to the participants: hence some types appear
more than once. The number of types was kept small in order to have round bliss
points, to ease the perception. During the experiment, agents always kept the same
utility (i.e. payoﬀ) function. This should ease the learning during the experiment.
Agents were always informed about the procedure used for making the collective
choice (either the mean or the median). The information concerning the previous
rounds’ results (up to ﬁve), in terms both of social choice and player’s payoﬀ,w a s
displayed on the screen.
Agents are assigned to groups of 3 people and receive 3 treatments in sequence
as described in Table 1.
Groups are formed without repetition (i.e. each agent always meets other people
having diﬀerent bliss points) and with the aim of forming collectives in which the
mean vote diﬀers from the median one in the case of sincere revelation. Half of the
participants start with full information about bliss points of the other two members
of their group, while the remaining participants have no information about either
the bliss points or the number of members in their group. After ﬁve rounds of mean
vote the scenario is reversed, i.e. those who had information are told that they are
now part of a group with an undeﬁned number of possibly new partners (and the
composition of their group is in fact changed), while those who had no information
beforehand now receive it. This design aims at verifying if there are eﬀects arising
from the sequence in which the treatments are administered. In the ﬁnal ﬁve rounds
every agent keeps his previous status in terms of information about the other people’s
bliss points and about the composition of the group, while the median voting rule is
9In the appendix are provided the instructions given to the participants at the beginning of the
experiment: the complete instructions are available from the authors upon request.
12Voting rule Mean Median
Round 1,..,5 6,..,10 11,..,15
Sequence of the treatments for:
12 people in groups of 3 i ni ni
12 people in groups of 3 ni i i
Total number of observations 120 120 120
i: players have information about other people’s bliss point
ni: players do not have information about other people’s bliss point
Table 1: the experiment design
used.
The main variable that varies during the experiment is the information supplied
to the participants. The design is in a sense prone to elicit strategical behavior as,
even according to the Ehlers et al. (2) approach, the smaller the group of voters the
larger the threshold for strategy-proofness. Even in a small group, however, a more
widespread sincere revelation of preferences should be seen under lack of information
than with information, as in the former case it is more cumbersome to design eﬃcient
strategies. Sincere disclosure of preferences is expected under median voting.
134D a t a A n a l y s i s
In Table 2 agents are classiﬁed according to whether they vote strategically or they
reveal their preferences. We term as strategical the votes close to the Renault and
Trannoy’s predictions (±0.5 along the 0-10 voting line), as a small deviation might
represent a sketchiness error. Similarly, it is assumed that revelation occurs if the
vote is close to the bliss point, i.e. ±0 . 5a l o n gt h e0 - 1 0v o t i n gl i n e .T a b l e2s h o w sa l s o
the incidence (on the total number of participants) of extremist - a term with which
we refer to those who exactly match the Renault and Trannoy predictions - and the
incidence of the fully sincere voters. The chosen deﬁnitions for strategical behavior
and for revelation imply that some overlapping occur, i.e. some votes satisfy both
deﬁnitions. This happens when the Renault and Trannoy deviation with respect to
the participant bliss is small enough, i.e., not larger than 1.
Strategical behavior (as previously deﬁned) and sincere revelation are able to
describe the conduct of around 65% of the participants. Sincere revelation is larger
under median voting than under mean voting. Sincerity is expected under median
voting: as the problem is unidimensional and single peaked, no misrepresentation of
preferences should occur (see Moulin, (3)). On the other hand, fully sincere reve-
lation occurs quite often also under mean voting and extremist behavior is neither
widespread nor specially linked to mean voting, two facts that cast some doubts on
the predictions based upon the Renault and Trannoy approach.
Repetition of the voting game under the mean rule seems to induce the partici-
pants to increase their resort to alternatives to the sincere revelation of preferences
(Table 3). On the other hand, under the median voting rule (to which the 15th
round refers) people seem to learn that sincerity pays.
A point of interest in this study concerns the role of information in aﬀecting



















23.33% 15.83% 50% 37.5% 8.03%
Mean (with
information)
18.33% 12.5% 50.8% 33.33% 5.83%
Median (to-
tal)








8.33% 5% 56.67% 41.67% 0%
Table 2: Modes of behavior under diﬀerent treatments
15With Information Without Information Total
1st round 50% 41.67% 45.83%
5th round 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
10th round 25% 33.33% 29.17%
15th round 58% 50% 54,17%
Table 3: percentage of sincere disclosures in rounds
Nash equilibrium which originates from the game is predicted independent from the
informational structure. Actually we have found empirical evidence of this asser-
tion: using the non parametric chi-square test, the null hypothesis that the sincere
disclosure of preferences is independent from the information provided cannot be re-
jected10. To note that this result holds whether the informational structure is tested
with reference to the mean or the median vote.
To further investigate the voter’s behavior in comparison with the predictions
of the Ehlers et al. (2) and the Renault and Trannoy (4) papers respectively, let’s
consider the sequence of treatments. The chi-square test11 shows that under the
mean voting rule with full information there are diﬀerences in behavior according to
whether the treatment is administered at the beginning of the experiment or after ﬁve
rounds of mean voting without information (Table 4). Experienced subjects resort
more often to extremist voting, while the overall incidence of this mode remains
small 12.
10Both at 5% and 10% level of signiﬁcance.
11χ2 =1 2 .42, df=2, critical value=9,21, signiﬁcant at α =0 .01.T h en u lh y p o t h e s i si sr e j e c t e d
(χ2 >C r i t i c a lVa l u e ). The null hypothesis states that the player’s experience does not aﬀect his
behaviour (i.e., sincere disclosure of preferences, Renault and Trannoy strategical behaviour, other)
12Paritioning Table 4 in two tablets, it turns out that the only signiﬁcative Chi-square refers to
the modalities “sincere+extremist” versus “other”.




Table 4: modes of behavior under mean voting rule with information
Voting Rule Mean
Information Yes (a) No (b) Total (a+b)
R e n a u l te ta l . 3.55 3.37 3.45
Ehlers et al. 2.06 2.08 2.06
Table 5: standard deviation with respect to predicted values
Table 5 reports the standard deviation13 of the actual voters’ choice with respect
to the two predictions. The prediction which exhibits a smaller deviation is the one
which exhibits more predictive accuracy. Table 5 suggests that there is a general
better ﬁt of the Ehlers et al. predictions.
The location of the player’s bliss point on the [0 − 10] voting interval may aﬀect
the individual behavior. On the one hand participants located towards the extremes
of the interval might realize more quickly which is their optimal strategy (i.e. voting
extremistically); on the other hand they might have less room for manoeuvre as
they are near the border. The opposite reasoning holds for those who have a central
position. To analyze this issue, the 0−10 line has been split in three intervals: [0,3],
]3 − 7[ and [7,10]. A chi-square non parametric test has been run. Under mean
13The standard deviation has been calculated as::




N−1 ,w h e r ex∗ is the predicted value
under consideration, x is the individual choice and N is the total number of votes in the relevant
rounds.
17voting, the null hypothesis that the voter’s position along the voting line does not
aﬀect behavior (in terms of either sincerely disclosing preferences or not), is amply
rejected both at 5 and 10% level of signiﬁcance. On the opposite, with the median
vote, the player’s location doesn’t seem to play any role in inﬂuencing choices (the
null hypothesis is accepted at 5%).
To further investigate the role of voter’s location, Table 6 reports the standard
deviation of the middle and side players respectively with reference to the Renault
et al.(4) and Ehlers et al. (2) predictions . When voters have no information, the
predictions of strategical behavior of Renault and Trannoy (4) tend to better ﬁts i d e
players rather than middle ones. The predictions of Ehlers et al. (2) are instead very
accurate for voters in a central position, in particular in the scenario with median
vote and full information. Hence one can infer that a location close to the extremes
renders more easy for the voter to ﬁnd a suitable strategy under mean voting, while
a central location eases the perception that sincerity pays under median voting.
Voting Rule Mean Median
Voter’s location No Inf Inf No Inf Inf
Renault et al. Side 2.96 3.57 2.64 3.5
Renault et al. Middle 4.11 3.57 2.94 4
Ehlers et al. Side 2.13 2.42 1.73 2.11
Ehlers et al. Middle 1.99 1.04 2.05 0.26
Table 6: side and middle players standard deviation with respect to predicted values
An issue which deserves attention concerns the social welfare ﬁr s tb e s to u t c o m e ,
and in particular the voting mechanism that gets closer to the social optimum. To
cope with this point, ﬁrstly the objective social welfare function must be deﬁned.
For this purpose a standard Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, given by the




Predicted: Renault et al. -0.90%
Predicted: Ehlers et al. -0.53%
Predicted: Moulin -2.19%
Table 7: welfare gap with respect to social optimum
group speciﬁc social welfare function and, therefore, with a social welfare maximizing
choice. Then the welfare gap with respect to this social optimum is calculated and
compared with the one that would have arisen under the predictions of Ehlers et al.
(2) (sincere revelation of preferences), Renault and Trannoy (4) (extremist behavior)
and Moulin (3). Table 7 shows that the welfare loss that actually occurred in the
experiment is larger than the predicted ones.
Thus the standard deviation 14 of the actual choice with respect to the social
optimum is computed and reported in Table 8. It is compared to the standard
deviation predicted in the light of the Ehlers et al. (2) and Renault and Trannoy (4)
articles (Table 8). The deviations of actual choices from eﬃciency are larger than
both the predicted15 ones. On the other hand, mean voting does not seem worse
than median voting from this point of view.
14The standard deviation has been calculated this way:




N−1 ,w h e r ex∗ is the social
optimum for the group, while x is the social choice (either actual, or predicted respectively by
Ehlers et al. (2) or by Renault and Trannoy (4) an N is the number of groups which receive the
speciﬁed treatment.
15The prediction of sincere revelation of preferences under median voting was made by Moulin
(3)










Actual choice 1.26 1.19 1.22 1.14 2.31 1.80 1.43
Renault et al. 0.78 1.03 0.91 0.32 1.07 0.78 0.86
Ehlers et al. 0.65 0.74 0.69 0.14 0.91 0.65 0.67
Table 8: standard deviation with respect to social optimum
5 Econometric analysis
Econometric analysis has been applied to a panel consisting of cross-sections of
individuals observed for a 15 round time series. The total number of observations is
360.
Thus a regression is set where strategy represents the regression’s dependent
variable. It measures the player’s strategic behavior and it is expressed by the abso-
lute deviation of the player’s actual choice with respect to his individual optimum.
The larger this distance, the more the player behaves strategically, i.e. the more he
deviates from his true preferences.
The following explanatory variables were considered:
period is a sort of trend variable useful to capture the players’ experience. It varies
from 1 (ﬁrst period) to 15 (last period). The use of a lagged variable (ruleofthumb:
see below) reduces the time series to 14 time observations (the ﬁrst period has been
lost);
inf is equal to 1 when full information is provided to the player, 0 otherwise;
votingrule is equal to 0 when a mean voting rule is implemented, 1 when the
median voting rule is implemented;
ruleofthumb explanatory variable is obtained by the diﬀerence between the indi-
20vidual bliss point with respect to the actual amount of the public good chosen inside
each group (on the basis of the actual individuals’ votes) at time t-1. The goal of
this variable is to capture a behavior based on ex post systematic adjustment to the
previous round result which conveys information about the other players vote.
mgvar is an indicator of the curvature of the utility function. The utility function
associated to each participant is:
U(x)=−ax2 + bx + c; a,b,c > 0
mgvar is given by the a parameter;
deltapref represents the distance in absolute value of the individual preferred
amount of public good with respect to the group speciﬁc mean value, i.e. the public
good amount which would be chosen by the group when all the members truly reveal
their preferences;
delta_rt_pref is a variable intended to catch the predictive accuracy of the Re-
nault and Trannoy expectations. The value of this variable represents the distance,
in absolute terms, between the Renault and Trannoy voting prediction and the in-
dividual’s true preferences;
constant is the constant term.
T h ep r e s e n c eo fh e t e r o s k e d a s t i c i t ya c r o s s panels was assessed by the likelihood
ratio test and the modiﬁed Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in ﬁxed eﬀects
regression model. A cross-sectional correlation (in ﬁxed eﬀect model) was detected
by the Breusch-Pagan statistic for cross-sectional independence in the residuals of a
ﬁxed eﬀect regression model.
Finally the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data models rejects the
null hypothesis of no ﬁrst order serial correlation.
To take all of these problems into account, a feasible generalized least square
model which considers heteroskedastic panels with cross-sectional correlation and
21panel speciﬁc correlation was implemented.
Table 9 reports the results of a feasible generalized least square estimate which
allows consideration of heteroskedasticity with cross-sectional correlation and panel-
speciﬁcA R ( 1 ) .









cross-sectional time series FLGS Time periods:14
Panels: heterosk. with cross-sectional corr. No. of groups: 24
Correlation: panel-speciﬁc AR(1) No. of obs. 336
Wald Chi2(7)=38.05 Prob>chi2=0.0000
*= Signiﬁcant at 5% level of signiﬁcance
Table 9: FGLS estimate
The two explanatory variables period and votingrule, which refer to the agent’s
experience and to the voting rule, have the correct sign and they are signiﬁcant. This
result conﬁrms what was found in the previous non-parametric analysis: the player’s
strategic behavior increases with experience but decreases when the median voting
rule takes the place of the mean voting rule. The inf (information) variable does
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the dependent variable, nevertheless it assumes the expected
sign: information boosts the strategic deviation from truth.
22The rule of thumb is highly signiﬁcant. Under this rule, the agent increases his
reported amount if the collective choice in the previous round was under his bliss
point, and decreases it in the opposite case. Together with the autoregressive nature
of the model (which probably captures also some eﬀects of incremental experience
and information), this suggests that subjects reacted through partial adjustments in
each round and this conduct was rewarding for them.
Also mgvar is signiﬁcant at 5% level of signiﬁcance. This result suggests that
strategic behavior is deeply aﬀected by potential loss/gain inherent to the individual
speciﬁc utility.
The variable deltapref measures the opportunity for lying available to the player,
in terms of distance of his bliss point from the group mean. The positive sign
associated with the deltapref coeﬃcient (even if the variable is not signiﬁcant) gives
some support to the interpretation that this opportunity was mainly exploited by
voters who were far from the group mean. Such an inference accords also with the
results discussed in § 4 with reference to the relevance of the agent’s location as a
factor that inﬂuences the propensity to behave strategically.
The last variable which deserves attention is delta_rt_pref.T h e f a c t t h a t t h i s
variable is not signiﬁcant may suggest that the Renault and Trannoy predictions are
unable to explain the player’s strategic behavior, but the positive sign suggests that
at least they are able to catch their "strategy trend".
236C o n c l u s i o n s
The experiment was designed in order to have a reference treatment in which people
are likely to cheat in voting, as they are put in small groups and have information
about other people’s bliss points, while mean voting is used. Besides this case, in the
further treatments it was expected that, under lack of information and under median
voting, more sincere revelation of preferences would occur. In fact the experiment in
a sense belied these expectations: it turned out that about one third of the votes were
fully sincere also in the reference case, thus suggesting that even in small groups and
with full information, the diﬃculties of ﬁnding suitable strategies are considerable.
One might also imagine that some people always prefer to tell the truth, but just one
agent chose this conduct in all the rounds, thus this interpretation is not supported
by our results.
Since even in the reference case sincere revelation was chosen to some extent,
the behavioral predictions made by Ehlers et al. (2), based on a kind of bounded
rationality approach, receive some support from this experiment and seem likely to
work in large groups. While experimental tests with larger groups remain to be
done, we expect in real life a social choice systems based on the ”forced to pay free
to choose” mechanism, in which people vote once in a while in very large collectives,
to oﬀer small incentives for widespread strategical misrepresentation.
On the other hand it emerges that strategical conducts tend to increase when
conditions become more favorable, thanks for example to repeated participation in
the experiment. Hence it also seems reasonable to expect strategical behavior to
arise in committees consisting of experienced professionals and extremist strategies
to represent a relevant limit result for these cases.
24Appendix
Hello. First of all we would like to thank you for participating in this experiment.
Everything you will have to do is simple and straightforward. There are no tricks.
Just follow the instructions on your screen. The answers are anonymous so nobody
will know who gave the answers.
This experiment represents a regional decision making process concerning public
expenditure on a public good. The regional expenditure ranges between 0 and 10
million euros.
Cost and beneﬁt vary according to the regional expenditure level.
The citizens’ net beneﬁt, which originates from the regional decision concerning
a public good, is increasing in the amount of public good provided until costs prevail
over beneﬁts.
Net beneﬁt varies between the participants in the experiment. It is even possible
that the net beneﬁt associated with a zero expenditure level could be positive. For
instance, when your private business might be more proﬁtable when public interven-
tion is absent.
Before the experiment starts, you will be informed about the regional expenditure
which provides you with the maximum net beneﬁt, i.e., your maximum earning.
The actual regional expenditure level is given by the mean of the “values” voted
by citizens, i.e., the values chosen by the participants in the experiment.
Each of you must indicate your preferred expenditure level, choosing a value in
the interval 0-10 (referring to millions of euros). You can also choose non integer
values — for example, 4.13 — but full stop rather than comma has to be used.
Afterwards, the computer will compute the mean. For instance, the mean of the
following:
2; 2.5; 4; 6.5; 10
25is
5.
The outcome (which reﬂects the ﬁnal regional choice) is provided jointly with
your personal earning.
Your personal earning is directly correlated to the regional expenditure, which in
turn depends on your choice and that of the other participants in the experiment.
Only one experiment out of the 15 rounds played in this experiment will be
randomly selected. You will be paid with what you earned in the selected round, at
a rate of 1 real euro per each experimental million euros.
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